



# AUS MODEL UNITED NATIONS

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**SECURITY COUNCIL - U**  
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AMERICAN UNIVERSITY OF SHARJAH  
MODEL UNITED NATIONS

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### **Director's Welcome Letter**

Dear delegates,

I am honored to welcome you to AUSMUN 2024, where you will play an essential role in shaping global discourse about world issues. This year's conference is set to be a platform for innovation, collaboration, and meaningful dialogue. Here we will explore global issues, analyze the complexities of the same, and propose solutions that satisfy the varying perspectives of countries in the international community.

It is important to remember that you think critically, engage in constructive debate, and seek to achieve common ground with your fellow delegates. At AUSMUN, we encourage you to approach this experience with an open mind and a commitment to finding a solution. This conference is not only a simulation but also an opportunity for you to develop skills that benefit your academic, professional, and personal lives. It is a chance to form connections with individuals who share a similar passion for global issues and diplomacy. I encourage you to make the most of this unique experience and to challenge your limits by thinking beyond the ordinary. Together, we will all contribute to the legacy of excellence that AUSMUN is known for.

I look forward to meeting you all and witnessing the remarkable contributions each of you will make to our conference.

Welcome to AUSMUN 2024, and let us embark on this enriching journey together. Warm regards,

Sarvagya Sharma Director of Research AUSMUN 2024

### **Moderators' Welcome Letter**

Dear Delegates,

Warm welcome to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) at AUSMUN. Delegates, have no fear as despite this being a competition, at the end of the day what matters most is the experience, knowledge, connections, and friends that you made. Bear in mind, you will find yourself in heated debates, power-play, and direct opposition with nations and interests of other delegates but we highly recommend that you keep those grudges within the committee and only among your country's policies and forget all of it outside the committee room.

In the course of these three days, we wish to see a constructive, logical, and versatile influx of opinions and debates and how you delegates bring forth the interests of your nation and stand by it firmly. While all committees at AUSMUN prompt delegates to understand their country's policy, the UNSC adds another level of realism and diplomacy that requires delegates to refine their negotiating skills. The UNSC is tasked with promoting and protecting international peace and security. To ensure that the committee runs as smoothly as possible, we hope that each and every one of you will bring unparalleled knowledge of your country's position and parliamentary procedure, as well as an understanding of the functions of the UNSC.

We advise you delegates that this background guide only serves as a starter for information and provides a direction, being delegates of the highest forum of the UN, you are expected to carry out thorough research and debate at your highest potential. Apart from what you have learnt from research, your nation's interests and so on, we wish to see innovative and original ideas, opinions and arguments on how to achieve those interests. At the end, what matters most to us is the overall learning of you delegates and what you take away from the conference. We wish you the very best for the conference and your future endeavors. Looking forward to seeing you all!

**Warm Regards,**

**Mohammad Amaan Siddiqui and Ayaan Lasheen**

You may contact us at [unscuausmun24@gmail.com](mailto:unscuausmun24@gmail.com)

Dais of the United Nations Security Council




## **Introduction to the Committee**

### **Brief about the Committee**

A century prior to the formation of the United Nations (UN), several international instruments attempted to alleviate conflict and resolve issues. Organizations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross and the Hague Convention are a few notable examples. Following the disasters of World War 1 (WW1), the Paris Peace Conference, also known as the Versailles Peace Conference in 1919, established The League of Nations in order to settle various disputes. However, the League of Nations was a highly flawed institution, lacked representation from most of the world, and failed to prevent multiple regional conflicts as well as World War 2 (WW2).

Formed in 1945, the UN Security Council (UNSC) is one of the six principal organs of the UN. It was formed in the aftermath of the failure of the League of Nations and aimed to prevent another world war and other forms of conflict. In a nutshell, its primary responsibility is to ensure international peace and security. The UNSC, however, was greatly paralyzed in its early stages due to the Cold War between the US and USSR and hence failed to take constructive decisions on conflicts related to the same, but continued to deal with other issues. In 1956, the first UN peacekeeping force was established to end the Suez Crisis.





### How is the UNSC Funded

The UNSC falls under the general UN structure; delegates and resolutions at the UNSC do not worry or discuss matters of funding. The budget is derived from the decisions made at the General Assembly Fifth Committee.



## Function of the Committee

The UNSC is composed of 15 member states, 5 of which are permanent (United States, United Kingdom, Russia, China, and France), and the remaining are elected by the General Assembly (UNGA) every 1-2 years. However, as per Article 31 of the UN Charter, any party not a member of the UNSC but that is involved in the dispute being discussed may be invited, without a vote, to the meetings as an observer state.

The UNSC's primary function is to maintain international peace and security in accordance with the principles and purposes of the UN. It also plays an integral role in investigating any dispute or situation that might lead to international friction, a threat to peace, or an act of aggression and recommends methods of reconciling or consequential actions thereof. Among the options that the UNSC can adopt for consequential actions is the placement of economic sanctions and other peaceful means or military aggression against an actor in certain cases.

Some of its specific functions involve the formulation of plans to regulate armaments, appointment of the Secretary General and election of judges of the International Court of Justice with the UN General Assembly. Article 25 of the UN Charter makes it the only UN organ whose decisions are binding and have to be carried out.

The UNSC can enforce its decisions in any way that does not involve the use of force. According to Article 41 of the UN Charter, *"The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations."*

Failing pacific attempts to resolve the dispute, the use of armed force is permitted as per Article 42 of the UN Charter: *"...demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations."* Such plans, however, must be made with assistance from the Military Staff Committee.

These decisions take place through a standard resolution voted on by the UNSC. According to Article 27 of the UN Charter, every member shall have one vote, and resolutions will pass given the affirmative vote of at least 9 members, including the 5 permanent nations. A negative vote by even one of the P5 nations counts as a veto and fails the resolution. Procedural votes follow different rules without the application of vetoes with vote requirements ranging from simple majority to a 2/3rd majority, depending on the motion in question.

## **Topic 1: Ensuring Peace in West Africa in light of the Recent Military Coups**

### **Summary and History**

Since 1950, the world has seen a sum total of 492 attempted coups, some successful, some not. Out of these 492, 220 attempts have been in Africa alone. Of these 220, 109 have been successful (Duzor & Williamson, 2023). These attempted coups have not been spread over time equally. In fact, the last three years have seen an increased amount of attempted and successful coups in Africa. Most of these coups have been carried out in the West African region, comprising Niger, Burkina Faso, Guinea, Chad, and Mali (Duzor & Williamson, 2023). West Africa generally comprises the countries from Senegal and Guinea-Biassau to Chad eastbound, Equatorial Guinea southbound, and Mauritania as the northmost point. Interestingly, the geographic placement of the states in which coups took place forms a belt-like formation. Subsequently, this region of Africa (Guinea, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Chad, and Sudan) has come to be called the “Coup Belt” (Coup Belt, n.d.). However, why are these coups taking place?

The reasons for these coups across the different countries are diverse. In Mali, the coup followed a series of protests dissenting against the government on issues of national security, legislative elections, and allegations of corruption. In Chad, the coup occurred in the form of an army takeover, following the death of President Idriss Deby in a battle with rebels. In Guinea, changes to rules around electoral terms and the resultant riots resulted in a takeover by a commander from the country’s special forces. Burkina Faso’s experience was also dictated by an army takeover; however, the reasons differed. The army replaced the president on grounds of the government’s failures in combating unlawful militancy. Finally, in Niger, the most recent example (July 2023), the coup was carried out by the presidential guard and supported by the junta on grounds of “bad governance” and poor handling of national security (Reuters, 2023).

Substantial commentary around these coups limits their analyses to contemporary affairs and concludes with judgments about these countries’ governance capabilities, regional instability, and corruption (Baltoi, 2023). However, there are many historical facets that demand exploration, too. Of immediate importance is the question of colonization. While the number of coups in itself is an alarming statistic, more alarming is the finding that of the 27 coups that have taken place in Africa since 1990, 78% of them have been in states that were previously French colonies (Cheeseman, 2023). These coups have been understood by many as attempts toward decolonizing from French neo-imperialism. A famous study about post-independence Francophone Africa exclaims, “colonialism has only changed form,” while exploitation remains constant (Lassou & Hopper, 2016, p. 45). France left systems that favored itself in its former colonies before de jure leaving them independent but de facto retaining significant control. France’s agreements with independence leaders and institutions it left behind, like the African Financial Community (CFA), are worthy of further research (Taylor, 2019). It is also interesting

to note that scholarly literature often discusses Gabon in the same category of states as coups in West Africa. Thus, while Gabon does not fall within the regional bounds, delegates may include discussing it as Gabon also faced a recent coup for similar reasons (UN News, 2023).

### Key Terms

1. **Colonialism:** Colonialism refers to the control of one power over another based on relationships where the dominant/home power enforces its authority, institutions, language, or culture to subjugate and exploit the subordinated power.
2. **Coup (coup d'état):** A coup is a sudden, forcible, generally but not necessarily military, attempted (or successful) removal of a formal government. Some conventions consider this inherently “illegal” and “immoral” but delegates are encouraged to propose a definition in the resolutions on their own logic before acting on them.
3. **Coup belt:** The coup belt is a neologism referring to a line of states from West to East Africa that are riddled by attempted or successful coups. This belt includes Guinea, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Chad, and Sudan. Some conceptualizations also include Gabon, which falls outside the ‘belt,’ but faces coups for similar reasons.
4. **Dissent:** Dissent refers to social and political opinions that are against the actions or beliefs of a majority opinion, especially of the government.
5. **Election violence:** According to Wikipedia, election violence “includes any acts or threats of coercion, intimidation, or physical harm perpetrated to affect an electoral process or that arise in the context of electoral competition.”
6. **De facto and de jure:** De facto refers to the *actual* reality, while de jure refers to a *legal* reality. For example, if a state is ruled by a party that the constitution does not recognize, it can be said that party X de facto rules the country but not de jure.

### Discourse on the Issue

The question about the use of violence to achieve possibly justifiable ends troubles many. Western liberal values would long posit that coups are inherently unjustifiable and obstruct justice (Mbara & Graham, 2023). However, there are many opposing ideological positions to this. Firstly, a significant strand of decolonial literature and practice does not see violence and coups as inherently evil (see Rao, 2000). Secondly, there seems to be public support on the ground against the leaders that many of these coups oust (Adetayo, 2023). Nevertheless, it is also tricky because support for the ousted does not imply support for the new incumbents. An analyst from the London-based think tank, Chatham House, believed that the support for the military takeovers is only “seeming” and is a form of “indirect support,” not support at all (Adetayo, 2023).

The events and commentary around them are also reflective of international relations. It is believed that much of the opinion construction against some of the coup leaders is based on the positions of these leaders toward the West. Simply put, the West and international organizations (IOs) express far greater dissatisfaction against regimes that prop up against the West, notably, France and the United States (Kayali, 2023). Despite this, commentators remain concerned that the number of constitutional, civilian-led governments in West Africa has substantially decreased between 2017 and today (Green, 2023).

Nevertheless, despite the value-loaded claims and dynamics in international relations that label different government changes and coups as legitimate or otherwise, international law is clear on the matter. As per Article 2(7) of the UN Charter: *“Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII,”* i.e., coups are a matter internal to a state’s affairs and do not inherently constitute a violation of the UN Charter.

This path is to be tread lightly, too; indeed, for even the principle of responsibility to protect (R2P) (responsibility to protect), many nations opposed intervention even for humanitarian reasons because of potential underlying political facets and vested interests. Overall, the question of coups covers several stakeholders. Immediately, the people, local politicians, businesses, and households are affected. On a broader scale, there are ramifications for any bilateral treaties other entities may have had with the former government. Then, one may also consider how the coup impacts the state’s international relations. Finally, coups and political events often cause other political events in neighboring states, triggering a domino effect.

### **Past and Current Actions by International Organizations**

In recent years, many international organizations, such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Trade Organization, have published significantly about factors of ‘good governance.’ These values connect directly with creating environments that are conventionally seen as conducive to trade and peaceful living. To that end, African states are often criticized for performing poorly on such indices. However, many critical studies disagree with these perspectives and approaches on grounds of historical considerations and power dynamics that often play out in how international organizations, especially the above listed trio, interact with African states. In fact, Philippe & Hopper (2016) refer to them as an “unholy trinity.”

Regionally, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) plays an important role in taking action and making declarations in post-coup scenarios. It emerged in

1975 as a community aimed at trade relations. However, it took on a military agenda over time with the belief that economic integration and growth are impossible without peace and security. Today, ECOWAS has a mandate encompassing military affairs, conflict mediation, and peacebuilding. In a way, it functions like the UNSC of West Africa (Mills, 2022). ECOWAS, too, adopts the ‘good governance’ framework. It has frequently resorted to placing sanctions on and suspending West African states from the organization for coups (Mills, 2022).

The United Nations has, so far, played a highly limited role in the coups. As no Security Council meeting on the question convened and concluded to take action, declarations and statements are all that can be found. For example, in August 2023, the United Nations “firmly condemned” the coup in Gabon (UN News, 2023). Earlier this year, though, a more comprehensive meeting took place on January 10, 2023 (SC/15169) that put forth more qualitative discussions around coups and their impact on various facets of life. The only action that can be traced to the UN pertains to UNSC/R/2690 (2023). This resolution was on the question of Mali and terminated the MINUSMA peacekeeping force, reaffirmed support for the transition government and human rights, and welcomed Mali’s proposition (agreed at an ECOWAS Summit in 2022) of organizing free and fair elections in February 2024.

Finally, this committee may choose to take action, too. The UN is tasked with maintaining international peace and security and taking effective measures to achieve this end (UN Charter, Art. 1). Normally, international organizations and the United Nations could not act or comment for action on the coups as they are an internal matter. However, given that this agenda is set for a UNSC meeting, the utilization of Chapter VI and VII can bypass the guaranteed sovereignty.

### **Questions that the Committee and Resolutions Should Address**

1. Are coups inherently bad—do they constitute appalling violations of any rights without genuine and justifiable reasons?
2. How will the UNSC ensure that its interventions accurately and effectively protect principles of human rights and local self-rule?
3. How will the UNSC, if at all, tackle matters concerning political dynamics and possible vested interests of other states, whether in Africa or abroad?
4. Independent or connected with other solutions, what will the UNSC’s position be regarding sanctions against states that experienced coups?
5. What other elements are important for consideration (incorporated into preambulatory clauses), and how, if at all, does the UNSC propose tackling them (operative clauses)?

### Suggestions for Further Research

Delegates are encouraged to be vigilant with the sources they use for research. The expert chair responsible for writing this section of the guide is of the belief that even the most conventionally “reputed” of sources have significant biases and political undertones to them. To that end, delegates are encouraged to review a wide variety of sources without overexaggerating the importance of the publisher. E.g., during debate, the chairs will entertain delegates to even counter the UN as a source, provided they give good logic. Nevertheless, the following are a few areas where research may be helpful:

- History of colonialism in West Africa with an emphasis on Francafrigue.
- History of and political dynamics involved in the formation of ECOWAS.
- Indigenous conceptualizations of self-rule and governance.
- Neoimperialism and foreign interests in West Africa.
- The use of sanctions and other organizational level controls (such as from ECOWAS) against states and their impacts (e.g., on the people).
- Discussions around de facto, de jure, and international relations concepts will prove important in understanding the legality and recognition of different coups from your country’s or generally normative standpoints.
- Why did the coups listed in the timeline (next section) take place? What interpretations of the ethical discursions of the coups are valid, and why?
- Why have more than 50% of the coups in the last 11 years taken place only in the last three years?

The following directories may also be useful for broader research and understanding of the UNSC and international law. This is, again, by no means an exhaustive list but merely an introduction.

- Chapter VI of the UN Charter will be helpful to understand what solutions delegates may include in their resolutions for a ‘Pacific Settlement’ to a ‘Dispute’:  
<https://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-vi/index.html>.
- Chapter VII of the UN Charter will be helpful to understand the crux of the *actions* that the UNSC can take, comprising sanctions, peacekeeping, and others, to take ‘Action’ against ‘Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace and Acts of Aggression’:  
<https://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-vii/index.html>.
- UNSC Resolutions Repository: <https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/resolutions-0>.
- UNSC Meetings Repository: <https://research.un.org/en/docs/sc/quick/meetings/2020>.
- ECOWAS Website: <https://ecowas.int/>.



- Responsibility 2 Protect:  
<https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/about-responsibility-to-protect.shtml>.

### **Timeline of the Major Events**

#### **2023**

- September - Burkina Faso coup attempt
- August - Gabon successful coup
- July - Sierra Leone coup attempt
- July - Niger successful coup

#### **2022**

- September - Burkina Faso successful coup
- January - Burkina Faso successful coup

#### **2021**

- September - Guinea successful coup
- May - Mali successful coup
- April - Chad successful coup
- March - Niger successful coup

#### **2020**

- August - Mali successful coup

#### **2019**

- January - Gabon coup attempt

#### **2015**

- September - Burkina Faso coup attempt

#### **2014**

- November - Burkina Faso uprising

#### **2013**

- May - Chad coup attempt



2012

- Mali successful coup

[... This is not an exhaustive list]

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## **Topic 2: Mitigating the growing nuclear threat amid the Russia-Ukraine War**

### **Summary & History**

Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union (USSR) in 1991, Ukraine gained independent statehood as the result of a formal referendum where 92% of its inhabitants voted in favor of leaving the USSR (now Russian Federation). The collapse of the union left a power vacuum and several unresolved territorial disputes, namely the status of Crimea and other eastern regions of Ukraine. Moreover, these disputes carry on in a polarizing political atmosphere, and Ukraine's close relationship with its Western allies becomes a larger concern and threat to Russia, resulting in persistent tensions between these states. Although enmity among these 2 nations has continued to exist over the last 3 decades, the current situation between Russia and the Ukraine has reached a major tipping point.

In April 2021, 100,000 Russian troops were stationed at Ukraine's borders, and by February 2022 Russia had moved in on Ukrainian territory, launching missiles at Ukrainian cities (Sullivan, 2022). This conflict has witnessed alarming escalation, with a pressing concern being the looming nuclear threat it poses.

Russia currently has the largest nuclear arsenal in the world, with an estimated 6,255 nuclear warheads, a legacy of the USSR (Faulconbridge, 2023). On the other hand, Ukraine; once possessing the third-largest atomic arsenal in the world; is a non-nuclear weapon state after relinquishing and destroying the nuclear warheads in 1994 under the Budapest Memorandum, signed by the US, Russia, and the UK. The memorandum guaranteed Ukraine's security and territorial integrity in exchange for its nuclear disarmament, allowing the nation to foster relationships with allies that possess a strong nuclear presence, such as NATO (NTI, 2023).

Amid this conflict, Russia has used nuclear coercion against both Ukraine and NATO. In response, Ukraine's nuclear-armed allies have condemned Russia's threats and increased their armed forces in the eastern flanks, which has significantly increased tensions between Russia and the West, heightening an impending risk of nuclear war. The situation has escalated to the extent that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky had to establish a new martial law, while also bolstering its military, declaring all male citizens between 16 and 65 years of age as a part of its army.

The threat of nuclear war amidst the Russia-Ukraine conflict has called into question the established nuclear agreements and assurances made by nuclear powers. Russia's 'attack' on Ukraine has led the Ukrainian president to hold the Budapest Memorandum invalid (UAWIRE,

2022). Along with this, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty collapsed due to the withdrawal of the US stating non-compliance from Russia, and Russia withdrew from the treaty the following day in response. This was the first major treaty to collapse in years, catalyzing a nuclear arms race between the major powers. These instances, along with threats of nuclear attack in the Russia-Ukraine war, spark debate on the efficacy of and undermine the current nuclear arms control regime.

### **Discourse on the Issue**

The conflict between Russia and Ukraine is the largest military conflict in Europe since World War II (Cooper et al., 2023). It has had a profound impact on global affairs, causing a humanitarian crisis, disrupting the global economy, raising the risk of nuclear war, challenging the post-Cold War international order, exacerbating tensions between Russia and the West, impacting global energy markets, and leading to rearmament of NATO countries (Sonne & Sanger, 2023; Bellinger III, 2022; EU, 2023; World Economic Forum, 2023; Aboulafia, 2022). The conflict violates several articles of the UN Charter, including the prohibition on the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state (UN Charter, Article 2(4)), the call for the peaceful settlement of disputes (UN Charter, Article 33), and the right to self-defense in the event of an armed attack (UN Charter, Article 51).

The situation has had a significant impact on social, economic, and political affairs across the world. Socially, it has caused a humanitarian crisis, with millions of people displaced and thousands killed (Cooper et al., 2023). It has also led to a rise in food insecurity and poverty in Ukraine and other countries (World Economic Forum, 2023). Economically, the conflict has disrupted supply chains and caused energy prices to rise, which has had a negative impact on the global economy and has exacerbated inflation in many countries (World Economic Forum, 2023). Politically, the conflict has challenged the post-Cold War international order and has exacerbated tensions between Russia and the West (Bellinger III, 2022; EU, 2023). It has also led to a rearmament of NATO countries (Aboulafia, 2022).

The conflict has affected different stakeholders differently. Ukraine has been the most affected, with a humanitarian crisis unfolding within its borders (Cooper et al., 2023). Russia has also been significantly affected by the conflict, due to economic sanctions imposed by the West (EU, 2023). NATO countries have also been affected, as they have increased military spending in response to the conflict (Aboulafia, 2022). Countries in the developing world have been the least affected, but they have been disproportionately impacted by food insecurity and energy price shocks (World Economic Forum, 2023).

## **Past International Organization (IO) Actions & Latest Developments**

Numerous international organizations (IOs) have played an active role in addressing the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Foremost among them is the United Nations (UN), with the UN Security Council convening multiple times to deliberate on the conflict. These sessions resulted in several resolutions condemning Russia's actions and advocating for a ceasefire. Notably, Russia's position as a permanent member of the UNSC has consistently led to the vetoing of these resolutions. Concurrently, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and other UN aid bodies have remained committed to providing humanitarian relief to Ukrainian civilians affected by the conflict.

Another pivotal organization in this context is the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which has responded to Russian hostilities by increasing its military presence in Eastern Europe and extending substantial military aid to Ukraine. The European Union (EU) has taken significant measures as well, imposing economic sanctions on Russia in response to the conflict and extending financial and military support to Ukraine. Additionally, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) has deployed a monitoring mission to Ukraine and has actively participated in mediation efforts between Russia and Ukraine.

The UN has previously addressed the Russia-Ukraine conflict, with a notable occurrence in March 2022 when the UN General Assembly passed a resolution condemning Russia's invasion of Ukraine and calling for a ceasefire. This resolution received 141 votes in favor, 5 against, and 35 abstentions (UN, 2022). It is important to note that while UN resolutions have been rendered less effective due to Russia's veto power in the Security Council, they have nonetheless contributed to the isolation of Russia and the exertion of international pressure on Russia to cease hostilities.

Despite the limitations inherent to international organizations, including the UN, such as the Security Council's veto power, the absence of a robust enforcement mechanism for UN resolutions, and the limited military capabilities of NATO and the EU, these organizations continue to play a vital role in addressing the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Their efforts encompass the provision of humanitarian aid, the implementation of sanctions, and the pursuit of a ceasefire. Furthermore, they are actively working to enhance global awareness of the conflict and garner international support for Ukraine.

In addition to international organizations, several individual nations have made significant contributions toward resolving the Russia-Ukraine conflict. The US has emerged as the primary provider of military and financial aid to Ukraine while imposing sanctions on

Russia. The UK, the second-largest contributor of military aid to Ukraine, has also enacted sanctions against Russia. Canada plays a substantial role by providing military aid to Ukraine and imposing similar sanctions on Russia. Japan has notably offered significant financial aid to Ukraine alongside its imposition of sanctions on Russia. Furthermore, other countries, including Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, and Taiwan, are actively contributing to the efforts to address the Russia-Ukraine conflict.

### **Questions that the Committee and Resolutions Should Address**

1. What would be an adequate approach to prevent the further use of nuclear weapons in the conflict? To what extent will these be effective?
2. How could the international community promote dialogue and diplomacy between Russia and Ukraine? Is the coexistence of these states possible?
3. How can the UNSC strengthen international order and prevent future conflicts? What approaches must be taken to ensure treaties and agreements are enforced?
4. How can we address the humanitarian crisis in Ukraine?
5. To what extent are the actions of both parties in this conflict justifiable?

### **Suggestions for Further Research**

This conflict is the product of years of rising tensions as highlighted throughout the guide. To truly resolve the matter, delegates must first understand the problem, and therefore, a great starting point is breaking down the history of the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Another area that may be useful is to do more research about the ethnic distributions of the 2 nations, and its implications on the state of Crimea. Finally, drawing inspiration from previous UNSC resolutions on the matter, as well as on similar conflicts around the globe, is key to understanding where international efforts are going, and how they can be improved, adhering to the UN charter. Here are some links that might prove useful:

1. <https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/resolutions-0>.
2. <https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-documents/ukraine/>
3. <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/ukraine-conflict-crossroads-europe-and-russia>
4. <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/why-did-russia-give-away-crimea-sixty-years-a-go>

5. <https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/ctc/uncharter.pdf>
6. <https://www.oecd.org/ukraine-hub/en/>

## Timeline of the Major Events

### 2014

- February 22: Russian President Vladimir Putin gives a speech in which he denies Ukraine's right to exist as an independent state.
- February 27: Russian forces invade Crimea, a peninsula in southern Ukraine.
- March 18: Crimea declares independence from Ukraine and votes to join Russia.
- April 12: The UN General Assembly (UNGA) votes to condemn Russia's annexation of Crimea.

### 2015

- February 12: The Minsk agreements, a ceasefire agreement between Ukraine and Russia, are signed.
- September 5: The Minsk agreements are violated when Russian-backed separatists launch an offensive in eastern Ukraine.

### 2021

- November 11: Russia begins to amass troops near the Ukrainian border.
- December 7: The US warns Russia of severe consequences if it invades Ukraine.

### 2022

- February 21: Russia recognizes the independence of two breakaway regions in eastern Ukraine: Donetsk and Luhansk.
- February 24: Russia launches a full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
- March 16: The International Criminal Court (ICC) opens an investigation into possible war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in Ukraine.
- April 12: Russia sinks the Ukrainian warship Moskva, the flagship of the Black Sea Fleet.
- May 16: The European Union agrees to ban most Russian oil imports.
- June 23: Russia takes control of the city of Severodonetsk in eastern Ukraine.
- July 28: Russia and Ukraine sign a deal to allow the export of grain from Ukraine.
- August 4: Russia launches a missile strike on the Ukrainian city of Vinnytsia, killing at least 25 people.
- August 9: The US announces a new \$550 million military aid package for Ukraine.
- September 10: Ukraine launches a counteroffensive in southern Ukraine.



- October 16: Russia launches a series of missile strikes on Ukrainian cities in retaliation for the bombing of the Kerch Bridge.

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