



AUS MODEL UNITED NATIONS

MMXXIV



GENERAL ASSEMBLY 1
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Introduction:

Director's Welcome Letter

Dear delegates,

I am honored to welcome you to AUSMUN 2024, where you will play an essential role in shaping global discourse about world issues. This year's conference is set to be a platform for innovation, collaboration, and meaningful dialogue. Here we will explore global issues, analyze the complexities of the same, and propose solutions that satisfy the varying perspectives of countries in the international community.

It is important to remember that you think critically, engage in constructive debate, and seek to achieve common ground with your fellow delegates. At AUSMUN, we encourage you to approach this experience with an open mind and a commitment to finding a solution. This conference is not only a simulation but also an opportunity for you to develop skills that benefit your academic, professional, and personal lives. It is a chance to form connections with individuals who share a similar passion for global issues and diplomacy. I encourage you to make the most of this unique experience and to challenge your limits by thinking beyond the ordinary. Together, we will all contribute to the legacy of excellence that AUSMUN is known for.

I look forward to meeting you all and witnessing the remarkable contributions each of you will make to our conference. Welcome to AUSMUN 2024, and let us embark on this enriching journey together.

Warm regards,

Sarvagya Sharma Director of Research

AUSMUN 2024



Moderators' Welcome Letter

Dear esteemed delegates,

Welcome to the United Nations General Assembly First Committee (UNGA): Disarmament and International Security, and the exhilarating journey you are about to embark on! This background guide serves as a compass for your deliberations, providing you with essential information to navigate the complex world of international diplomacy. Our aim is to ensure an unforgettable experience, and we've invested significant effort to achieve this goal. In return, we expect our delegates to demonstrate a similar commitment by conducting thorough research on their country's positions regarding the discussed topics.

Throughout your journey in GA1, you will be tasked with representing the interests and policies of your assigned nation, advocating for your country's unique perspective on the various issues at hand. Therefore, for a comparable United Nations-like experience, we highly recommend that you memorize the rules of procedure, including points and orders. Nevertheless, it is vital to highlight that this background guide is a tool to aid your research and not a shortcut to achieving comprehensive knowledge. As delegates, it is your collective duty to engage in extensive research, engage in debates, and foster a deep understanding of your country's stance to contribute meaningfully to the proceedings of GA1.

Finally, we wish you well as you prepare for the sessions and look forward to seeing the fresh ideas and creative solutions that will result from the discussions in GA1. If you have any queries or recommendations for the committee, feel free to reach out to us at any time via our email: ga1ausmun24@gmail.com



Zakariah Tamer Shanableh

I am an Industrial Engineering freshman at AUS. My passion for MUN began over 4 years ago in 2019, and I have since participated in multiple MUNs across the country as both a delegate and an organizer. I eagerly look forward to chairing the GA1 committee this year at AUSMUN 2024.



Karam Osamah Alkhazali

As a sophomore at the American University of Sharjah, my four-year journey in Model United Nations (MUNs) has shaped my perspective on global affairs. Transitioning from delegate to organizer, I am excited to take on the role of chairing. As we approach the conference in 2024, I eagerly anticipate fostering engaging discussions and facilitating the collaborative spirit that defines the MUN experience.



Lubna Abdullah



Nidaa El Khatib

I am a freshman at the American University of Sharjah and my 7th MUN experience so far. I can't wait to make this an unforgettable MUN for so many of you. See you soon!


Function of the Committee

The First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly was established to deal with disarmament and matters of international security. This committee is an essential part of the UN's mandate to prevent wars and uphold international stability since it was formed to promote global peace and security via discussions and coordination of actions relating to arms control, non-proliferation, and disarmament. The numerous duties of the General Assembly include deliberative, supervising, financial, and elective activities, all of which are covered by the UN Charter. The General Assembly is unable to enforce its resolutions or compel state compliance, its primary functions are deliberation and recommendation-making (*United Nations General Assembly 2023*). This constraint is caused, in part, by its size and the variety of subjects it covers; in the 1960s, this feature gave rise to voting blocs with regional bases. "During the Cold War the Soviet Union and the countries of eastern Europe formed one of the most cohesive blocs. Since the 1980s and the end of the Cold War, blocs have formed around "North-South" economic issues—i.e., issues of disagreement between the more-prosperous, industrialized countries of the Northern Hemisphere and the poorer, less-industrialized developing countries of the Southern Hemisphere." Notably, a significant portion of funding for the UN Human Rights Council is derived from voluntary contributions made by Member States and other donors, comprising almost two-thirds of the total. The remaining financial support is drawn from the UN regular budget, which is approved by the General Assembly 1 and funded through assessed contributions from each Member State (*OHCHR - UN Human Rights Office 2023*).

Voting procedures

Key decisions are decided by a two-thirds majority; however, most matters are decided by a simple majority (*General Assembly*). A simple majority means a proposal is approved if there are more "yes" votes than "no". However, important and serious issues need more people to agree, usually at least two out of every three, to be approved like: amendments to the UN charter or suspension of a member's state voting rights due to a breach of the Charter's principles.

This diagram visually represents the UN system and corresponds to AUSMUN. It reflects the relationships between committees and clearly demonstrates the committee's position, significance, and powers as defined under the UN charter.



Topic I: The Suspension of Russia from the New START Treaty

Summary and history

The new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) is a treaty created between the United States and the Russian Federation in 2010 to cap the number of Strategic Offensive Arms that the USA and Russia can deploy. Coming into force in February of 2011, it has since been a cornerstone in maintaining global security, fostering stability, transparency, and predictability between the two nuclear superpowers. However, recent geopolitical tensions and alleged violations from both the USA and Russia have raised concerns about the effectiveness of the agreement. Russia's decision to suspend the New START Treaty in February of 2023 has become a critical topic of concern, sparking intense discourse in the international community.

The START Treaty originated as a series of agreements between the USA and the USSR (now, Russia) during the Cold War. The first treaty, START I, was signed in 1991, with its primary focus being the reduction and monitoring of strategic nuclear weapons, including intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and heavy bombers. Its goal was to enhance transparency and trust between the two superpowers. START I expired in December of 2009; however, both sides agreed to abide by the terms of the treaty until an agreement for a renewal was reached (*BBC* 2009). The New START Treaty was the successor to START I, coming into effect in 2010. These treaties aimed to limit the development of nuclear weapons and to maintain global security through arms control and disarmament measures.

In February of 2023, the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, announced his decision to suspend the New START Treaty. Attempting to gain strategic leverage, Putin stated that treaty activities would not continue until the USA cuts off support for Ukraine, as well as bring France and the United Kingdom into talks concerning arms control in light of recent geopolitical tensions (Bugos, 2023). Furthermore, the Russian Foreign Ministry has pinned the blame for their suspension on the USA, accusing the USA of failing to comply with its provisions, and for, allegedly, attempting to sabotage Russia's National security (Al Jazeera, 2023). Regardless, the USA has expressed that it remains ready to discuss strategic arms limitations with Russia, irrespective of their relationship.

More recently, in June of 2023, the office of the spokesperson of the USA Secretary of State has called Russia's suspension of the New START Treaty (2023) "irresponsible and unlawful", in addition to claiming that it is legally invalid, as both parties are bound by their obligations under the treaty. Moreover, the USA has made various allegations of Russia's non-compliance, stating that:

- Russia is hindering and preventing the USA from inspecting their nuclear arsenal

- Russia is refusing to meet in the treaty's implementation body
- Russia no longer provides notifications mandated by the treaty

The US has stated that this non-compliance places strain on the treaty's viability.

Key Terms Pertaining To This Topic:

- **START:** Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. A nuclear arms reduction treaty between the USA and Russia, was created to limit and monitor the Strategic Offensive Arms of both countries respectively.
- **Non-compliance:** Failure to act in accordance with the terms of the treaty. Both the USA and Russia have accused each other of failing to provide notifications and allowing inspections of their respective nuclear arsenals.
- **Suspension:** Temporary cessation of the operation of a treaty. Parties suspended from a treaty are no longer obligated to act in accordance with the treaty.
- **Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC):** The compliance and implementation body that meets at least twice a year. The BCC is required to meet biannually in Geneva, Switzerland, unless different arrangements are agreed upon by both parties.
- **Notifications:** Updates regarding the treaty members' nuclear arsenal that would otherwise not be available. These notifications are in regard to all strategic delivery vehicles, launchers, ICBMs, and SLBMs.
- **ICBMs** – Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles. These are primarily designed for nuclear weapons delivery, with a range greater than 5,500 kilometers.
- **SLBMs** – Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles. These are missiles capable of being launched by submarines, primarily used for the delivery of nuclear weapons.

Discourse On The Issue

Significance:

Russia's suspension of the New START Treaty sparks international discourse, marking a decline in arms control efforts (Xiouri, 2023). The escalating tensions signal a potential new arms race, highlighting the renewed importance of arms control and the need for a successor treaty post the New START's 2026 expiration (Kirpekar, 2023).

Violation of the UN Charter:

This move violates UN Charter principles, including Article 2(3), 2(4), and Chapter VI, encouraging peaceful dispute resolution and disarmament (Nayan & Oak, 2023).

Implications:

Decreasing information exchange strains social and political relations (Kirby, 2023). Vladimir Putin strategically uses the New START Treaty to leverage the United States, intensifying insecurity and uncertainty globally. This situation unfolds in a complex, multipolar world where nations like Iran, South Korea, and China actively shape the nuclear landscape.

Abandoning arms control agreements diminishes global incentives, eroding trust and complicating future agreements.

Stakeholders:

The most affected are the USA and Russia, owning 90% of the world's nuclear arsenal. NATO members and Ukraine face increased risks; the New START breakdown could have dire consequences for NATO members relying on the U.S security umbrella. Non-nuclear nations, like Belarus and Kazakhstan, less affected, could be drawn into conflict or become inadvertent targets.

Economic and Political Implications:

The prospect of an arms race carries economic implications, including resource diversion, financial burdens, and trade disruptions. The political landscape transforms, with heightened diplomatic challenges fostering greater divisions. Society grapples with public anxiety and social concerns, such as peace movements and the humanitarian impact of conflict (Kirby, 2023).

The Path Forward:

The future of arms control and international stability hinges on addressing this issue and forging a path forward.

Past International Organization (IO) Actions & Latest Developments

The New START treaty involves three main international organizations. It includes various arms controls to monitor aspects of nuclear disarmament, particularly regarding the



peaceful use of nuclear energy. The organization mainly involved in this was the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 2010. However, it's important to note that the IAEA is not a party to this new START treaty. The IAEA plays a crucial role in ensuring peaceful usage of nuclear energy. Another organization directly affiliated with the new START treaty is the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO). This organization works specifically towards ensuring that there is not any nuclear testing occurring to limit the development of the nuclear arsenal of countries. Other functions of this organization are monitoring seismic, hydroacoustic, and infrasound stations, and verifications, which involve bilateral inspections that regularly exchange data, notifications, and on-site inspections. Lastly, the Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC) was established by the new START treaty to address compliance issues, resolve questions, and facilitate the implementation of the treaty (BCC, 2010).

The United Nations has made several efforts to address this issue in the past. Involving the issue of nuclear disarmament, the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is known to be one of the most important agreements concerning nuclear disarmament (*NPT Treaty* 2005). This strategy has demonstrated its effectiveness in averting the widespread proliferation of nuclear weapons. Throughout its history, it has seen the enactment of numerous resolutions aimed at disarmament and arms control. Additionally, various forms of sanctions and embargoes have been imposed to reinforce these measures. These different attempts - sanctions and embargoes - were effective to a certain extent as they were able to limit the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Regardless, the UN is limited because of political differences, enforcement issues, slow progress, and ever-evolving threats. These constraints result in the delayed realization of the intended outcomes from the various resolutions, thus diminishing the effectiveness of the agreements.

On March 30th, 2023, Russia failed to provide its obligatory biannual data update. The new START treaty involves extensive biannual data updates to ensure that the USA and Russia are both kept in check. Afterwards, on June 1st, 2023, Russia ceased fulfilling its notification obligations which involved the status and location of treaty-accountable items, such as missiles and launchers. The USA continues to provide Russia with notifications of intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched missiles. Furthermore, the USA has denied new START treaty inspections on USA territory by nullifying Russian New START treaty inspectors. Subsequently, Russia also does not exercise its right to facilitate new START treaty inspections on USA territory and, instead, has denied the USA its right to conduct its inspection activities. Moreover, the US has not been providing telemetric information on launches of the US intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched missiles (*Bureau Of Arms Control*, 2023). Between those two months, there was no repercussions occurring between Russia and the USA.

The UNGA does not have direct authority over bilateral agreements, like the New START Treaty. Its role is advisory and political, primarily focusing on global issues and encouraging disarmament norms. The UNGA can pass non-binding resolutions expressing the international community's will but it cannot take direct action or make decisions regarding the New START Treaty. The authority to make changes or take actions related to the treaty lies with the governments of the United States and Russia, as it is a bilateral agreement between them (U.S. Department of State, 2007). The UNGA is involved with

overlooking this treaty and making sure that all guidelines are followed. There has been many resolutions regarding this issue. Here is a list of these resolutions:

1. Draft Resolution on Nuclear Weapons
2. Draft Resolution on the Legacy of Nuclear Weapons
3. Draft Resolution on a Treaty Banning the Production of Fissile Material for Nuclear Weapons
4. Draft Resolution on Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones
5. Draft Resolution on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)
6. Draft Resolution on Accelerating the Implementation of Nuclear Disarmament Commitments
7. Draft Resolution on the Establishment of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the Middle East
8. Draft Resolution on the Risk of Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East
9. Draft Resolution on Ethical Imperatives for a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World
10. Draft Resolution on African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty
11. Draft Resolution on Prohibition of the Dumping of Radioactive Wastes

Questions that the Committee and Resolutions Should Address

Discussions and resolution papers should aim to answer the following questions:

- What are the prospects for extending the New START Treaty beyond its current duration, and what are the implications of doing so? Additionally, should there be discussions about pursuing new arms control agreements or updating existing ones to address evolving threats?
- How do the ongoing nuclear transformation efforts by the United States and Russia impact strategic stability and arms control agreements? What measures can be taken to prevent an arms race and maintain a stable balance of power?
- How can the international community ensure compliance with the New START Treaty and effective verification mechanisms? Are there ways to enhance transparency and confidence in each party's adherence to the treaty's limitations and provisions?
- How can the New START Treaty contribute to global disarmament efforts, and what role should it play in broader multilateral disarmament initiatives? Are there opportunities to expand its scope or replicate its success in other regions or with other nuclear-armed states?

Suggestions For Further Research

- Moscow and Washington's historical nuclear relationship
- Possibilities of future nuclear treaties
- Impact on Regional Security Dynamics for NATO and Ukraine
- Legality and Challenges Around Treaty Suspension

- Nuclear weapons proliferation in other nations

<https://www.cfr.org/timeline/us-russia-nuclear-arms-control>

<https://carnegieendowment.org/2016/02/26/role-of-nuclear-weapons-in-u.s.-russian-relationships-pub-62901>

<https://www.iiss.org/en/research-paper/2023/04/beyond-new-start-forecasts-for-future-russian-us-arms-control/>

<https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2023-03/features/three-competitor-future-us-arms-control-russia-china>

<https://thebulletin.org/2023/03/legal-aspects-of-russias-new-start-suspension-provide-opportunities-for-us-policy-makers/>

Timeline of Major Events

April, 2010: The United States and Russia sign the New START Treaty in Prague. The treaty replaces the expired START I Treaty and limits the number of deployed strategic nuclear warheads and delivery systems.

December, 2010: The U.S. Senate ratifies the New START Treaty with a strong bipartisan vote. The treaty enters into force.

February, 2011: The New START Treaty officially comes into effect, limiting both countries to 1,550 deployed warheads and 700 deployed delivery systems.

2020: The Trump administration attempts to broaden the treaty to include China, but these efforts do not lead to any significant changes or an extension of the treaty.

February, 2021: The United States and Russia agree to extend the New START Treaty for an additional five years, preventing it from expiring on February 5, 2021.

February, 2021: Russia's Foreign Ministry expresses concerns about the possibility of the United States deploying missile defense systems near Russia, which could potentially threaten Russia's security.

February, 2021: The extended New START Treaty comes into effect, preserving the arms control measures for another five years.

February, 2023: Russian President Vladimir Putin announces the suspension of the New START Treaty, citing the need for the U.S. to cut off support for Ukraine and involve France and the United Kingdom in arms control talks

June, 2023: Russia ceases fulfilling its notification obligations regarding the status and location of treaty-accountable items, while the U.S. continues to provide notifications

June 2023: The office of the spokesperson of the U.S. Secretary of State calls Russia's suspension of the New START Treaty "irresponsible and unlawful," citing Russia's non-compliance

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Topic 2: Mitigating the Threat of The Proliferation of Biological Weaponry

Summary and History

The proliferation of biological weaponry has been deemed a grave threat to international stability and human safety by the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA). Over the years, the exponential advancements in biotechnology has caused concern in the international community over the potential destructive uses of such weapons which could include hazardous biological agents such as Anthrax, Botulinum Toxin, T-2 Mycotoxin, and ricin. Effectively addressing this threat requires global collaboration, severe regulations, and constant monitoring in order to properly mitigate the threat of this proliferation.

International restrictions of biological weapons were first put in place by the 1925 Geneva Protocol, which only prohibited the use, but not the possession, of biochemical weapons in war (*1925 Geneva Protocol*). In the following decades, the use of chemical and biological weapons in World War II, coupled with tensions during the Cold War and significant advancements in biological research, global concerns regarding the devastating potential of these biological weapons grew massively. The most notable example of the use of biological weapons in World War II was by the Imperial Japanese Army's Unit 731, based in occupied China. Unit 731 conducted some of the most notorious and heinous human experimentation in human history, where diseases such as anthrax, plague, and cholera were inflicted on prisoners of war and innocent civilians to study the effect of these diseases and to develop their biological weapons further. The activities of Unit 731 resulted in the death of thousands (Guardian News and Media, 2002).

International pressure from organizations and advocates (such as the World Health Organization and the Red Cross) led to the drafting and signing of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) in 1972. The BTWC further prohibited the development, manufacturing, acquisition, transfer, and stockpiling of biological weapons (*Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) 2023*). As of March 2021, the BTWC has reached almost global membership, with 185 state parties, and 4 signatory states (*Biological Weapons Convention*).

The emergence of the issue regarding the proliferation of biological weaponry has been propelled due to various factors. Most notably, the aggressive advancement of biotechnology has made the creation of biological weapons much more widely accessible, thereby also amplifying international concern over potential harm. Furthermore, the lack of regulation and monitoring in certain regions, such as Central and South America, as well as the Middle East, has led to the creation of a breeding ground, leading to the rapid exploitation of biological and chemical weapons with the intent to harm. These factors coupled with geopolitical tensions have ignited the urgent need for rapid and robust mitigation.

Key terms pertaining to this topic:

- **Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC):** Disarmament treaty widely prohibiting biological weapons in all aspects. The BTWC aims to safeguard global security by fostering international cooperation and adherence to strict regulations against the use of biological weapons.
- **UNODA:** United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs. UNODA drives global disarmament by supporting nations in implementing disarmament agreements, preventing weapon proliferation, and facilitating post-conflict disarmament.
- **Biological weapons:** The UNODA defines a biological weapon to be a weapon that disseminates disease-causing organisms or toxins to harm or kill humans, animals or plants.
- **Proliferation:** The rapid and widespread growth or spread of something. In this context, it refers to the uncontrolled and unauthorized distribution of biological weapons.

Importance of Mitigating The Threat

The global implications of successfully mitigating this threat are significant, encompassing various aspects of global security and stability. The most notable of these implications include enhanced global security, the promotion of international collaboration, and the protection of public safety. Thereby, it is clear that reducing the threat is vital for global security and encourages international cooperation, leading to a more stable global community.

Discourse on the issue

In the 21st century, biological weapons loom as a critical security concern, presenting a significant threat to global public health and human life (Carnegie Endowment, 2023). The recent COVID-19 pandemic serves as a stark reminder of the potential for widespread transmission of diseases, and its devastating impacts (WHO, 2023). These perilous armaments, continuously evolving and advancing at a rapid pace, intensify the real risk of either accidental release or deliberate use (Stimson Center, 2023). Such an occurrence could serve as a trigger for catastrophic pandemics, sowing not only chaos and fear but also potentially leading to a surge in casualties, public panic, and long-term psychological trauma (Carnegie Endowment, 2023).

The proliferation of biological weapons represents a clear violation of the United Nations Charter particularly the principles outlined in Chapter VI, relating to the peaceful resolution of disputes (UNODA, 2023). The nature of these weapons undermines transparency and trust among nations (Carnegie Endowment, 2023). Their use, or even the mere threat of their use, can disrupt economies, and healthcare systems could become

overwhelmed, leading to resource shortages (WHO, 2023). Trade disruptions, travel restrictions, and supply chain interruptions may hinder economic growth (UNODA, 2023). The financial costs of preparedness, response, and recovery are immense (Stimson Center, 2023).

The proliferation of biological weapons also jeopardizes international relations, cooperation, and trust (State Department, 2023). Entities involved in such activities such as state actors seeking to develop bioweapons risk sanctions and diplomatic isolation, intensifying global tensions (Carnegie Endowment, 2023). The issue also extends to non-state actors such as terrorist organizations who seek to obtain biological agents (State Department, 2023). The ambiguity of attribution in a biological attack can breed mistrust and potentially trigger retaliatory actions, escalating political conflicts (UNODA, 2023).

Past International Organization (IO) Actions & Latest Developments

The BWC, WHO, UNODA, and INTERPOL all work together to prevent the spread of biological weapons. The BWC is an international promise that countries won't make or use these weapons (Davenport, 2022). The UNODA helps countries follow this promise and gives them advice. The WHO and INTERPOL team up to keep the world safe from biological weapons (United Nations, 2022). They all work together to make sure everyone follows the rules and stops these dangerous weapons.

The UN set up the BWC on April 10, 1972, to stop biological weapons. Resolution 1540 (2004) says countries in the party are doing good things, like not using harmful gases. The UN checks and follows BWC rules through reviews and meetings (Schneider, n.d.). The UNGA passed resolutions like 1540 (2004), 1673 (2006), 1810 (2008), 1977 (2011), 2325 (2016), 2572 (2021), and 2622 (2022). These resolutions encourage countries to be open and work together on biosecurity and defense. Confidence-building measures, like the Arms Control Act and NATO actions, help build trust between countries. But actions like trust-fostering visits can make trust go down, especially if there are doubts about following the rules or the measures' effectiveness (Chevrier, 1998, p. 17). The UN's success in preventing biological weapons depends on how well they talk and work together. Progress is seen in how well the BWC follows the rules and how many countries support stopping biological weapons. Resolution 1540 (2004) and later resolutions in 2016 and 2022 show the UN's commitment to stopping nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons (UN Security Council Resolution 1540, 2004).

Questions that the Committee and Resolutions Should Address

Discussions and resolutions papers should aim to answer the following questions:

- How can the international community enhance measures to prevent the proliferation of biological weapons, and what steps can be taken to ensure full compliance with the BWC?
- What strategies should international guidelines adopt in order to more effectively address emerging threats with regard to bioweapons?
- What resource reallocations and budget changes will result in the greatest difference in the non-proliferation of biological weapons?
- How can the international community reach a balance between researching life sciences, and biotechnology for research, medicine, and agriculture while preventing the development of biological weapons?

Suggestions for further research:

- Biological weapons proliferation and economic impacts
- Factors inhibiting adherence to the BWC
- Solutions to mitigate biological weapons proliferation
- Safeguard inspections for biological facilities
- Biological warfare and terrorism
- Anti-crop warfare

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Timeline:

- **1925 - Geneva Protocol:** The Geneva Protocol is signed, prohibiting the use of biological and chemical weapons in warfare, marking one of the earliest international efforts to curb the proliferation of biological weaponry.
- **1971- Nixon ends USA's Biowarfare Program:** The renunciation of the development and production of biological weapons marks a significant step towards disarmament.
- **1972 - Biological Weapons Convention (BWC):** The BWC enters into force, banning the development, production, and acquisition of biological weapons. It establishes verification mechanisms to prevent the proliferation of bioweapons.
- **1984 - UN General Assembly Adopts Resolution on Bioweapons:** The resolution of the 39th session calls for the complete elimination of biological weapons and the need for strengthened verification methods.

- **2000- U.S Ratification of the BWC Verification Protocol:** The USA's ratification reaffirms its commitment to strengthening the treaty's verification methods.
- **2001 - Anthrax Attacks in the United States:** A series of anthrax attacks in the United States raise concerns about bioterrorism, highlighting the need for improved measures to mitigate the proliferation of biological weapons.
- **2005 - BWC Review Conference:** The Seventh Review Conference of the BWC emphasizes the importance of strengthening the treaty and enhancing national implementation measures.
- **2011 - Biosecurity and Biopreparedness Initiative:** The United Nations launches the initiative to enhance global biosecurity and biopreparedness, focusing on preventing the proliferation of bioweapons and mitigating their potential impacts.
- **2016 - Biological Risk Reduction Program:** The World Health Organization (WHO) establishes the Biological Risk Reduction Program to promote biosecurity and reduce the risk of biological weapons proliferation.
- **2020 - Global Health Security Agenda (GHSA):** GHSA members work to improve international capacity to prevent, detect, and respond to biological threats, including bioterrorism.
- **2021 - Biological Threats Strategy:** The United States releases a National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats, outlining its approach to mitigate the proliferation of biological weapons and bioterrorism threats.
- **2022 - Pandemic Treaty Proposal:** Discussions regarding a global treaty to improve preparedness and response to pandemics gain momentum, aiming to address both natural and deliberate biological threats.
- **2023 - BWC Review Conference:** The upcoming Review Conference of the BWC provides an opportunity for international stakeholders to strengthen efforts to mitigate the proliferation of biological weaponry and enhance biosecurity.

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